Pakistan has reached a grim milestone in 2026, but the headline tells only part of the story.
For the first time since the Global Terrorism Index was created, Pakistan has been ranked as the country most affected by terrorism. The finding comes even as terrorism declined globally in 2025, making Pakistan’s deterioration stand out against a broader international trend.
The Institute for Economics & Peace, which publishes the Global Terrorism Index, gave Pakistan a score of 8.574 out of 10. The country recorded 1,139 terrorism-related deaths and 1,045 incidents during 2025, with 1,595 people injured.
Former Pakistani ambassador to the United States Husain Haqqani responded by pointing toward a much older question: how did Pakistan arrive at a point where militant violence has become such a serious domestic security problem?
His criticism has reopened a debate over decades of security policy, militant networks and the consequences of treating some armed groups differently from others.
Pakistan’s Ranking Is More Significant Because Global Terrorism Fell
The most striking detail is not simply that Pakistan moved to number one.
It is when it happened.
Worldwide, terrorism deaths fell by 28 percent in 2025, from 7,714 to 5,582. Terrorist incidents also declined by 22 percent to 2,944. The Institute for Economics & Peace said 81 countries improved their terrorism scores, while only 19 deteriorated.
Pakistan moved in the opposite direction.
Its 1,139 deaths represented the country’s highest terrorism-related death toll since 2013 and marked the sixth consecutive year in which terrorism deaths increased. Interestingly, the number of incidents actually fell slightly from 1,098 in 2024 to 1,045 in 2025.
That combination is important. Fewer attacks did not mean less deadly violence.
The TTP Has Become the Central Part of the Problem
The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, or TTP, is a major reason for Pakistan’s worsening position.
According to the Global Terrorism Index, the TTP remained Pakistan’s deadliest terrorist organization for the fifth consecutive year. It was responsible for 56 percent of terrorism-related deaths in Pakistan in 2025.
The group carried out 595 attacks that resulted in 637 deaths, an increase from 555 deaths the previous year. The TTP was also ranked the world’s third-deadliest terrorist organization in 2025.
The trend is especially significant because TTP activity has increasingly focused on Pakistan’s security forces as well as civilians.
The result is a difficult security equation: the state is fighting an armed movement that has adapted its tactics while operating in an environment where border geography makes militant activity difficult to contain.
Why Afghanistan Is Part of the Story
The Global Terrorism Index links Pakistan’s deterioration partly to the regional security environment following the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan in 2021.
The Afghanistan-Pakistan border remains one of the world’s major terrorism hotspots. The index notes that many persistent terrorism zones share several characteristics, including porous borders, weak state control and communities that cross national boundaries.
Pakistan has repeatedly accused the Afghan Taliban authorities of allowing TTP militants to operate from Afghan territory.
The Taliban government has rejected those accusations.
That disagreement has become a major source of tension between Islamabad and Kabul. It also means Pakistan’s terrorism problem cannot be understood entirely through events inside Pakistan itself.
But there is an important distinction here: blaming Afghanistan alone does not explain the entire trajectory.
Balochistan Adds Another Layer
Pakistan is facing more than one militant threat.
The Balochistan Liberation Army, or BLA, has also expanded its activities, particularly in Balochistan. The group opposes the Pakistani state and has targeted government and security interests as well as Chinese nationals and projects associated with the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.
The GTI identified a BLA attack on a passenger train in 2025 as Pakistan’s largest terrorist attack of the year.
The attackers seized the train and held hundreds of passengers hostage. According to the index, 21 hostages, four military personnel and 33 attackers were killed.
This demonstrates why Pakistan’s security challenge cannot be reduced to a single organization.
TTP violence is concentrated largely in the country’s northwest, while Baloch militant activity is a major concern in the southwest. These conflicts have different political backgrounds and objectives.
The “Snake in the Backyard” Argument
Haqqani’s reaction focused on the long-term consequences of Pakistan’s security policies.
He used the metaphor of raising snakes in one’s own backyard, arguing that militant groups once cultivated or supported for strategic purposes can eventually turn against the state itself. His remarks reflect a long-running debate over Pakistan’s past use of militant proxies and the distinction historically made between groups considered useful for external objectives and those viewed as domestic enemies.
That is Haqqani’s interpretation, rather than a conclusion established by the Global Terrorism Index itself.
Still, it points to a central question raised by Pakistan’s current security crisis: Can a country permanently separate “useful” militancy from “dangerous” militancy?
The history of militant movements in the region suggests that such distinctions can become increasingly difficult to maintain once organizations develop their own networks, finances, ideology and recruitment systems.
Pakistan’s Security Problem Is Also an Economic Problem
Terrorism does not stop at the battlefield.
Repeated attacks create additional costs for governments, businesses and communities. Roads need greater security. Infrastructure projects require protection. Foreign companies face additional risks. Tourism and investment can suffer when violence becomes persistent.
This is especially relevant for Pakistan because the BLA has targeted Chinese interests and CPEC-related infrastructure.
In other words, terrorism can become an economic multiplier: insecurity raises costs, higher costs weaken investment, and weaker economic opportunities can contribute to instability.
Breaking that cycle requires more than military operations.
The Global Picture Is More Complicated Than Pakistan’s Ranking
Pakistan’s number-one ranking should not be interpreted as meaning it has become the world’s only major terrorism hotspot.
Six of the ten countries most affected by terrorism in the 2026 index are in sub-Saharan Africa. Burkina Faso, Niger, Nigeria, Mali, Somalia and the Democratic Republic of Congo remain among the most heavily affected countries.
The global decline in terrorism also matters.
The number of terrorist deaths has fallen dramatically compared with the height of the Islamic State era. But violence is becoming more geographically concentrated, particularly in fragile regions and borderlands.
That is why Pakistan’s position is significant: it is one of the clearest examples of how a global decline can coexist with a severe regional deterioration.
What Happens Next Matters More Than the Ranking
A ranking can describe a problem, but it cannot solve one.
Pakistan now faces the difficult task of reducing violence from organizations with different objectives while dealing with tensions along its western border.
The Global Terrorism Index itself points toward a combination of military, political and socioeconomic measures rather than a single solution.
Military operations can disrupt militant networks, but lasting improvement also depends on intelligence cooperation, border management, political stability, economic opportunity and the ability of state institutions to prevent militant organizations from rebuilding.
There is also a regional dimension. Afghanistan’s policies, Pakistan’s internal politics and instability in Balochistan are connected to a wider South Asian security environment.
The Bigger Lesson Behind Pakistan’s Number-One Ranking
Pakistan’s position at the top of the Global Terrorism Index is therefore more than a statistic.
It is a warning about what happens when militant violence becomes embedded in a region’s political and security environment for years.
The most important question is no longer simply why Pakistan has so many terrorist attacks.
It is whether Islamabad can break the cycle that allows militant organizations to repeatedly reorganize, recruit and return.
Global terrorism may have declined in 2025, but Pakistan’s experience shows that the threat has not disappeared. It has become more concentrated, more regional and, in some places, more deeply connected to unresolved political and security problems.
For Pakistan, the 2026 index is not merely a ranking to dispute or defend.
It is a measure of a security problem that has been building for years—and a test of whether the country can change the conditions that allow that problem to persist.
